CBA at the PTO by Masur, Jonathan
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2016
CBA at the PTO
Jonathan Masur
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan Masur, "CBA at the PTO," 65 Duke Law Journal 1701 (2016).
MASUR IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016 3:40 PM 
 
CBA AT THE PTO 
JONATHAN S. MASUR† 
ABSTRACT 
  What are the costs and benefits of patent laws? While Congress 
and the courts are often able to evade this difficult question, there is 
one institutional actor that is not only well-advised but also required 
to consider costs and benefits: the Patent and Trademark Office, 
which—as an administrative agency—is required by executive order 
to conduct cost-benefit analysis of all economically significant 
regulations. Yet the agency’s efforts have been less than satisfactory. 
In its cost-benefit analysis, the PTO overlooks crucial functional 
considerations, misunderstands basic precepts of patent economics, 
and resists quantification when quantification is required. In 
combination, these shortcomings suggest that the PTO has not 
correctly measured the social costs and benefits of the rules it creates, 
in part because it has adopted an overly limited view of the welfare 
effects of intellectual property and the agency’s own role in promoting 
or discouraging IP. In other instances, the PTO has promulgated 
rules that will likely have tremendous economic significance without 
recognizing their importance or conducting a cost-benefit analysis. 
These errors cast doubt on whether the PTO’s regulations will 
increase or diminish social welfare. Before the PTO is granted any 
additional substantive authority, reform will be necessary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What are the costs and benefits of changes to the rules governing 
patents? This question would seem crucial to sound stewardship of 
the patent system, whether that stewardship is undertaken by courts, 
Congress, or the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Yet it is 
surprisingly difficult to answer with any accuracy. Not only are the 
dynamic effects of patents complex and challenging to measure 
empirically,1 but there is often wide theoretical disagreement as well.2 
Accordingly, it is not surprising to see Congress and the courts 
proceeding with legal reform without a full understanding of the new 
patent rules’ costs and benefits. Neither institutional body typically 
attempts to understand or calculate costs and benefits before making 
law.3 In the case of courts, many judges (and commentators) believe 
that consideration of costs and benefits is outside of, or even inimical 
to, the judicial role. 
However, there is one institutional actor that is not only well-
advised but also required to consider costs and benefits: the PTO. In 
1981, President Reagan mandated by Executive Order that all 
administrative agencies perform cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of all 
“economically significant” regulations that they issue.4 That mandate 
has remained in force across every subsequent presidential 
administration.5 An “economically significant” rule is one that creates 
an economic impact of at least $100 million.6 Of course, one might 
 
 1. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 75–77 
(2015). 
 2. See Tom Nicholas, Are Patents Creative or Destructive?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 405, 405–06 
(2014). 
 3. See Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 276–78 (2011). 
 4. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). 
 5. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 
C.F.R. 215 (2012) (Obama). 
 6. 3 C.F.R. 638, 641.  
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suppose that major rules rarely, if ever, emanate from the PTO. The 
PTO is not typically considered a source of important administrative 
regulations. Unlike canonical administrative agencies such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the PTO lacks the power 
to promulgate substantive rules of law through regulation.7 For this 
reason, it is widely assumed that whatever rules the PTO produces 
must be insignificant, and those rules have received little attention. 
The PTO does, however, produce regulations, many of which 
could significantly impact the shape of patent law and the types of 
patents granted, despite the fact that they are not “substantive” legal 
rules in the typical sense. Of particular importance are the PTO’s 
rules setting patent application fees.8 These rules affect the number 
and types of patent applications filed with the PTO, and thus the 
number and types of patents the agency will grant. In fact, the PTO 
deemed its fee-setting regulations economically significant, triggering 
the agency’s obligation to conduct cost-benefit analysis.9 This cost-
benefit analysis provides a window into the PTO’s own perceptions of 
the costs and benefits of intellectual property and the ways in which it 
believes its actions will affect social welfare. The picture that emerges 
is disquieting.  
Although the PTO deserves commendation for attempting CBA 
in such a complex field, its analysis is deeply flawed in several 
respects. It overlooks crucial functional considerations, 
misunderstands basic precepts of patent economics, and resists 
quantification when quantification is required (though surely 
difficult). In combination, these shortcomings suggest that the PTO 
has not correctly measured the social costs and benefits of the rules it 
creates, in part because it has adopted an overly limited view of the 
welfare effects of intellectual property and the agency’s own role in 
promoting or discouraging IP. 
In other cases, the PTO has promulgated rules that will likely 
have tremendous economic significance without recognizing their 
importance. One example is the set of rules governing patent office 
 
 7. Masur, supra note 3, at 279. At the same time, some commentators see the PTO as 
being heavily involved in making patent law via formal adjudication. See, e.g., Melissa F. 
Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1960, 1978 (2013). 
 8. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212 (Jan. 18, 2013). 
 9. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, SETTING 
AND ADJUSTING PATENT FEES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 10 OF THE LEAHY-SMITH 
AMERICA INVENTS ACT, FINAL RULE 3 (2013). 
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procedures, including the procedures for inter partes Review (IPR), 
Post-Grant Review (PGR), and Covered Business Methods (CBM).10 
Although the PTO seems to think of these rules as mere procedural 
housekeeping, early experience has already demonstrated that even 
small procedural adjustments can have enormous legal and economic 
impacts. Had the PTO properly understood the law and economics of 
patents and the role its own procedures play in promoting or 
diminishing innovation, the significance of these procedural choices 
would have been made clear. The agency must adapt its CBA 
procedures to account for its central role in patent policy. 
Finally, numerous scholars have called on Congress to afford the 
PTO substantive rulemaking authority over patent law, much as 
agencies ranging from the EPA to the Department of Energy possess 
substantive rulemaking authority over the areas of law they oversee.11 
If the PTO were ever granted such authority, it would have to 
dramatically expand and improve its cost-benefit processes and 
procedures. This would be a difficult but not impossible task and 
could yield valuable information regarding the innovation economy. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. The first Part briefly 
describes the history and practice of cost-benefit analysis. The second 
Part analyzes and critiques the PTO’s cost-benefit analysis of its fee-
setting regulations. The third Part explores the PTO’s procedural 
rulemaking and discusses the economic impact of the PTO’s 
procedural rules, as well as the reasons why the PTO appears to have 
underestimated that impact. In the fourth Part, the Article closes by 
theorizing as to how the PTO might expand and improve its cost-
benefit practices to accommodate cost-benefit analysis of major 
substantive legal rulemaking. 
 
 10. Patent and Trademark Office, Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 
Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method 
Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
 11. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent 
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 272 (2007) (suggesting that 
standard administrative law principles should govern PTO activities); John M. Golden, 
Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1097–1111 (2011); 
Masur, supra note 3; see generally Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation 
Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2008) (proposing a centralized 
innovation-focused agency).  
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I.  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: A BRIEF PRIMER 
Cost-benefit analysis is a technique developed by economists in 
the middle of the twentieth century for measuring the economic 
benefits and harms of a given law, policy, regulation, or project.12 As 
the name indicates, a policymaker employing cost-benefit analysis 
calculates the expected benefits and costs of a policy or project, 
typically in monetary terms. The policymaker should then pursue 
only projects whose benefits will exceed their costs, and ideally those 
projects that will maximize benefits net of costs. Cost-benefit analysis 
first became part of the administrative state in 1981, when President 
Reagan mandated by executive order that agencies perform cost-
benefit analysis before promulgating major regulations.13 That 
mandate has been maintained by every president since Reagan, 
including Presidents Clinton14 and Obama.15 
Proponents have offered a number of justifications for cost-
benefit analysis, but the most persuasive is that it operates as a 
welfarist decision procedure.16 That is, cost-benefit analysis provides 
substantial information regarding whether a given policy will increase 
or decrease social welfare. It does not offer a complete answer, 
because CBA typically measures costs and benefits in monetary 
terms.17 For example, if a proposed regulation would save 100 lives 
but require the installation of an expensive piece of equipment, CBA 
would require a policymaker to place monetary values on the lives 
saved and the cost of installing the equipment, and then compare the 
two. Accordingly, cost-benefit analysis is best understood as 
 
 12. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of 
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 7), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2646063 [https://perma.cc/ ZN W7- P9ZU] 
(describing the history of cost-benefit analysis and the administrative state); ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOPERATION & DEV., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 16, http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/tools-evaluation/ 361 9 0 261. pdf [http://
perma.cc/QAY3-ZB95] (last visited on Jan. 15, 2016) (describing the history of cost-benefit 
analysis). 
 13. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). 
 14. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) 
 15. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012); see also John Bronsteen, Christopher 
Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis v. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 
1603, 1606 (2013) (noting the failings of traditional cost-benefit analysis and proposing an 
alternative well-being based analysis). 
 16. MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 62 (2006). 
 17. Bronsteen et al., supra note 15, at 1612. 
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measuring whether a given policy or regulation is efficient—whether 
it will increase wealth, rather than welfare. For this and other reasons, 
cost-benefit analysis has been widely criticized.18 In response, CBA’s 
defenders have argued persuasively that policies based on cost-
benefit analysis will produce greater social welfare over the long run 
than policies that are not put to a cost-benefit test or are based on an 
inferior substitute.19 Most importantly, this normative back-and-forth 
has not shaken CBA’s position in the administrative state. Cost-
benefit analysis is firmly entrenched and shows no signs of 
relinquishing its position. 
The Patent and Trademark Office is a branch of the Department 
of Commerce. As an executive-branch agency, it operates subject to 
executive orders mandating cost-benefit analysis of all regulations 
with an annual economic impact of at least $100 million.20 However, 
unlike agencies such as the EPA that have been regulating and 
performing cost-benefit analyses for years, the PTO is a relative 
newcomer to the process. The PTO has not typically possessed 
significant rulemaking authority and thus has had little reason to 
perform CBA in the first place. That changed to some extent with the 
2011 America Invents Act (AIA),21 which vested the PTO with 
authority over its own fees and several new administrative processes 
(in addition to other legal changes).22 The result was a suite of new 
PTO regulations. The following Parts analyze two of those 
regulations—one that involved a CBA, and one that did not. The 
 
 18. See generally, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON 
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (arguing that 
cost-benefit analyses have been used to justify bad policies, particularly in the healthcare and 
environmental regulation contexts). 
 19. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 16, at 6; Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, 
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 225–38 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition 
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1060 (2000); see generally RICHARD L. 
REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008) (arguing that 
uniform use of cost-benefit analysis throughout the administrative state will result in more 
efficient and fair regulations); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2010) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is superior to feasibility 
analysis).  
 20. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). 
 21. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316–17 
(2011) [hereinafter AIA].  
 22. The other most significant legal change enacted by the AIA was to switch the United 
States from a “first to invent” patent system to a “first to file” system. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 
(2012). 
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PTO’s use of cost-benefit analysis, and even the explanation for its 
decision not to use cost-benefit analysis, shed significant light on how 
the agency understands patents’ benefits and harms for innovation 
and society. 
II.  THE PTO’S FEE-SETTING RULE 
The AIA gave the PTO the power to set its own fees for the first 
time in the agency’s history.23 Pursuant to this authority, and after 
engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking, in 2013 the agency 
promulgated a major rule setting fees for the myriad services it 
provides to patent applicants and owners.24 Applicants file hundreds 
of thousands of patents each year, and each filed patent generates 
thousands of dollars in fees (if not tens of thousands).25 The total 
amount of money collected by the PTO is substantial. The PTO 
estimated that it would collect approximately $14 billion in fees from 
private parties between 2013 and 2017, the five years covered by the 
rule.26 Because of the large amount of money at stake, the PTO 
deemed the rule a “significant regulatory action,” which triggered its 
obligation to conduct cost-benefit analysis.27 So far as can be 
determined, this was the first full-scale cost-benefit analysis the PTO 
has ever conducted. It thus provides a unique opportunity to examine 
the PTO’s own conception of the social and economic effects of 
patents and how it understands the benefits and harms of its legal 
choices. 
The PTO is to be commended for its efforts to produce a reliable 
cost-benefit analysis, especially considering that this was its first 
effort. Nonetheless, as this Part will explain, the PTO’s CBA includes 
two fundamental errors, which render it essentially useless as an 
indication of the actual costs and benefits of changes in patent rules. 
First, the PTO seems to have adopted an extraordinarily narrow view 
of patents’ costs and benefits, overcounting and undercounting 
benefits and costs in a variety of ways. At bottom, it is not clear that 
 
 23. AIA § 10. 
 24. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212 (Jan. 18, 2013). 
 25. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S. 
PATENT STATISTICS CHART, CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2014; Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 4218 tbl.2. 
 26. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4213. 
 27. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 3; Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 
638 (1994). 
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the PTO even understands how patents produce social costs and 
benefits. Second, the PTO did not quantify any of the costs and 
benefits of its rule, choosing instead to report only “qualitative” costs 
and benefits. It is easy to sympathize with the agency’s decision. 
Quantifying the costs and benefits of changes to patent rules is a 
devilishly difficult exercise, as the agency itself acknowledges. 
However, in several instances the failure to quantify leaves the PTO 
entirely at sea when deciding between two similarly structured fee 
schedules. It is thus impossible to have any confidence that the PTO 
has chosen the optimal fee rules, even among the few alternatives it 
considered. 
A. The Rule’s Framework 
The PTO’s fee-setting decisions were driven by two competing 
considerations. First, the agency hoped to accomplish a number of 
substantive goals, most importantly (1) encouraging innovation, while 
(2) improving its own operations, and in particular decreasing the 
time it takes the agency to review and examine patent applications.28 
Second, the PTO is required to fully fund its own operations through 
the fees it collects. Accordingly, the agency needed to set its fees so 
that the revenue it collects would fully cover the costs of examining 
the patent applications it receives. 
The PTO imposes dozens of different fees, from $23,000 for 
requesting IPR to $40 for registering a patent assignment (sale) by 
nonelectronic means.29 For present purposes, however, there were 
only two design choices of great consequence. First was the PTO’s 
decision to raise initial application fees—the suite of fees it charges 
patent applicants when they first submit patent applications—but 
nonetheless hold them below the PTO’s costs. The PTO raised initial 
application fees from $1260 to $1600—an increase of 27 percent—but 
kept them well below the PTO’s own costs of examining a newly filed 
patent.30 The PTO’s second design choice was made to fill this budget 
shortfall: it raised patent renewal fees—the fees that patent owners 
must pay after 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years if they wish to keep their 
patents valid—well above their current levels and well above the 
levels needed to cover the agency’s costs of maintaining these 
 
 28. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4222. 
 29. Id. at 4223–26. 
 30. Id. at 4224. 
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patents.31 To be specific, the PTO raised the 3.5-year maintenance fee 
by 39 percent, the 7.5-year maintenance fee by 24 percent, and the 
11.5-year maintenance fee by a whopping 54 percent.32 It is not saying 
much to note that these fees are well in excess of the PTO’s costs; the 
cost of “maintaining” a patent that was granted years ago is trivial. It 
is essentially just a matter of accurate recordkeeping, which is done 
electronically at low cost. 
With these two design choices, the PTO chose to implement a 
system that coupled low up-front application fees with high back-end 
renewal fees, believing that such a fee structure would best promote 
innovation while still allowing the agency to fund its own operations.33 
In addition, the PTO argued that the overall increase in fees would 
allow it to hire more examiners.34 This would in turn permit the 
agency to examine patents more quickly, diminish the backlog of 
patent applications awaiting PTO attention, and reduce the average 
pendency of applications. The PTO has been widely criticized for 
taking a long time to examine and grant patents, and the agency 
believed that these steps would allow it to accelerate its operations.35 
These design choices drove the PTO’s cost-benefit analysis. 
Nonetheless, the PTO’s analysis of its own rule is dubious, as the next 
two sections will explain. 
B. Patent Costs and Benefits 
In performing its cost-benefit analysis, the PTO grouped the 
benefits and costs of the rule into three distinct categories. First, there 
are the costs of PTO operations—for example, the costs involved in 
hiring PTO examiners to scrutinize patent applications.36 Second, the 
PTO considered any grant of a patent to be a benefit, and thus any 
reduction in the number of patents that the agency would grant was 
 
 31. Id. at 4225. 
 32. Id. 
 33. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 14–19. 
 34. Id. at 53. 
 35. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, A Few Problems at the PTAB, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 4, 2014), 
http:// patentlyo.com/patent/2014/08/few-problems-ptab.html [http://perma.cc/KP9W-98C7]; 
Backlog, THE PATENT PROSPECTOR (Dec. 14, 2008), http://www.patenthawk.com/ blog/2008/12/ 
backlog.html [http://perma.cc/3GWL-4FX7]; Patent Office Faces Backlog Crisis: Criticism Heats 
Up As the PTO Scrambles to Cope, HIGHBEAM RESEARCH (Jan. 10, 2005), https://www.
highbeam.com/doc/1G1-127873376.html [http://perma.cc/N577-X5V2]. 
 36. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 15. 
MASUR IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  3:40 PM 
1710 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1701 
counted as a cost.37 Third, and relatedly, the agency treated any delay 
in the granting of a patent—any time that elapsed between the 
moment of application and the moment the patent was granted—as a 
cost as well.38 Accordingly, any reduction in patent pendency—that is, 
any decrease in the time it took for a patent to be granted—was 
viewed as a benefit. The next Sections consider these costs and 
benefits in turn. 
1. PTO Operation Costs.  The PTO’s first step in tallying costs 
and benefits was an astute one. The PTO rightly noted that fees paid 
to the agency by applicants are neither costs nor benefits but merely 
transfers from private parties.39 These fees, by themselves, do not 
increase or decrease social wealth. They move wealth from one party 
to another. But when the fees are used to hire PTO examiners, who 
then invest time and labor examining patents, those expenditures are 
considered costs. The examiner’s time, a valuable resource, is being 
consumed. This is analogous to a firm being forced to hire a 
compliance officer to help the firm conform to a new regulation, or 
hiring a contractor to install newly mandated safety equipment. In all 
cases, a regulation is mandating that valuable labor be consumed. Of 
course, the cost of examining patents is due not to the PTO’s fee 
collection but to the fact that it examines patents in the first place. 
Nonetheless, the amount of fees that the PTO collects determines 
how many examiners it can hire, and thus determines the cost of its 
operations. The PTO’s treatment of this cost was on target. 
2. The Benefits and Costs of More and Faster Patents.  It is with 
the second and third categories of costs and benefits that the PTO ran 
into difficulty. The PTO’s second source of costs and benefits was 
based on the number of new patent applications that would be filed 
during the period when the new fees were in effect.40 The PTO 
understood that an increase (decrease) in filing fees would decrease 
(increase) the number of new patent applications filed. As fees rose, 
some applicants might elect not to pursue a patent in the belief that it 
was not worth the cost of filing. Critically, the PTO viewed each new 
patent application as a source of social welfare: “Lost patent value 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 16–17. 
 39. Id. at 34. 
 40. Id. at 15. 
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represents the Office’s assessment of the cost to society from the 
expected decrease in successful patent application filings (serialized 
applications) due to an increase in filing . . . fees.”41 Thus, the agency 
viewed any increase in projected patent filings (compared with the 
status quo ante) as a benefit and any decrease in projected filings as a 
cost. 
The PTO’s third category of costs and benefits is closely related. 
For purposes of its cost-benefit analysis, the PTO treated delays in 
granting a patent as a cost.42 The PTO reasoned that while a patent 
was pending before the PTO, the putative owner could not obtain any 
value from it.43 Accordingly, a patent granted after one year would 
produce greater value for its owner than a patent granted after two 
years. Together, these two categories of costs—the quantity of patents 
granted, and the speed at which they are granted—shed light on how 
the PTO understands the costs and benefits of patents. In the PTO’s 
analysis, more patents, and shorter review periods, are always better. 
Anything that prevents inventors from applying for patents, or 
anything that slows down patent grants and deprives inventors of 
longer patent terms, creates costs. 
The PTO’s analysis suffers from two fundamental errors. The 
first significant problem with the PTO’s approach is that it improperly 
conflates the private value of patents to their owners with the value of 
patents to society at large.44 To be sure, every time a private actor is 
granted a patent, that actor has received a benefit. Similarly, if a firm 
receives a patent one year after filing, instead of two, the firm is 
better off.45 
But these are only private benefits that accrue to the patent 
holder, not social benefits. A patent is a means of extracting rents: the 
owner of a patent can often exclude others from the market and thus 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 16–17. 
 43. Id. at 13. In addition, the PTO counted any uncertainty during a patent’s pendency 
regarding whether it would be granted (and the scope it would cover) as a cost. This cost is 
largely redundant to the cost of delay itself. 
 44. See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
687, 689–91 (2010) (making this distinction); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Costs and 
Benefits, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (July 2, 2013), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/ 2013/ 07/ 
costs-benefits.html [http://perma.cc/8AV3-CL QZ] (same). 
 45. A patent is valid for twenty years from the date the application is filed. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(a)(2) (2012). Accordingly, if a firm is granted a patent after only one year of examination 
instead of two, the firm will have nineteen years of patent exclusivity, rather than eighteen 
years. 
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charge higher (monopolistic) prices. These monopoly rents are not 
social gains. They are merely transfers from consumers or other 
producers to the patent owner. The revenue from selling a patented 
product provides some indication of the social value of the product, 
even when the product is sold for a monopoly price. But this is a 
measure of the social value of the product (or the innovation behind 
it), not the patent. After all, the product might well have come into 
existence without the patent ever being granted. At the same time, 
the fact that the patent owner is charging monopoly prices means that 
some consumers, who would otherwise consume the patented product 
if it were priced competitively, will be excluded from the market. This 
creates deadweight loss, which is an economic cost when measured 
against a baseline of competitive pricing.46 Thus, from a static 
perspective, looking only at what consumers must pay at a given 
moment in time, patents represent only social costs, not benefits.47 
And for a government agency seeking to maximize overall efficiency 
(or welfare or some similar quantity), social costs and benefits—not 
private benefits—are what matter. 
If there are social benefits to patents, they must derive from the 
dynamic incentives they create.48 If firms and individuals believe that 
they will be able to obtain patents covering their inventions, they will 
be more likely to innovate in the first place because the rewards will 
 
 46. Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 480 (2011). 
 47. To be sure, the profits from a patented invention provide a rough estimation of that 
invention’s social value, or at least the producer surplus it generates. But, again, this is the value 
of the product, not the value of the patent. The invention might have come into existence at the 
same point in time without the patent, in which case the patent produces zero social benefits 
and only costs (in the form of deadweight loss). The social benefit of the patent, if any, derives 
from innovation that would not have taken place (or would not have taken place so quickly) but 
for the patent. 
 48. Scholars have put forth a number of alternative theories regarding the social benefits of 
patents. See generally, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (offering a “prospect” theory of patents in which the first parties to 
receive patents in a field can efficiently organize and coordinate follow-on research); Stephen 
Yelderman, Coordination-Focused Patent Policy (Aug. 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2481025 [http://perma.cc/P67H-7F5Z] 
(analyzing patent policy in terms of its ability to encourage coordination between firms). Patents 
were also conventionally thought to provide the benefit of disclosing valuable technical 
information, but that view has fallen into disfavor. Compare Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent 
Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009) (arguing for the importance of the disclosure function 
in the patent system to stimulate innovation), with Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents 
Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545 (2012) (describing the need to 
reframe the debate over the disclosure function of the patent system). I do not mean to 
minimize these other theories; I mean only to focus on what most scholars believe are the 
primary benefits of patents, and the principal reason for their existence.  
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be greater. (This is of particular importance when competitive pricing 
would not allow firms to recover the up-front costs of research and 
development.) Thus, if there are social benefits from granting patents 
and granting them more quickly, they are a step removed from the 
grant itself. Moreover, these benefits depend on the behavior not only 
of the parties who obtain the patents, but also other putative 
innovators who observe the PTO’s behavior and make research and 
development decisions based upon that behavior. 
At various moments the PTO appears to understand the point 
that private patent benefits are not equivalent to social benefits. It 
describes the benefit from reducing the amount of time the PTO 
takes to grant a patent as an “[i]ncrease in private patent value from a 
decrease in pendency.”49 The PTO also describes the costs and 
benefits of rules that will lead to granting more or fewer patents in 
private-value terms: “Granted patents are also considered to evaluate 
the change in private patent value.”50 At another point in its cost-
benefit analysis the PTO is even more explicit: “The Office assumes 
that if these unfiled applications had been granted, total private value 
would have increased consistent with the change of patent value.”51 
These statements are correct: reducing the time a patent is 
pending will increase its private value (to its owner), and granting 
more patents will increase the amount of private value being created 
for the patent owners. Any time a government agency creates a 
property right and distributes it to an owner, it provides a private 
benefit to that new owner. The problem is that those benefits are only 
one piece of a cost-benefit analysis, which should focus on overall 
social costs and benefits, not merely the private costs and benefits to 
certain parties.52 And yet the PTO includes them wholesale in its cost-
benefit analysis. 
This error seems so fundamental that one wonders how the 
intelligent economists and lawyers at the PTO could ever have made 
it.53 It is possible that the agency did not believe that it could 
 
 49. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 4 tbl.1-1; see also id. at 6 (“Long 
patent application pendency negatively affects private patent value . . . .”). 
 50. Id. at 21. 
 51. Id. at 28. 
 52. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 16, at 6. 
 53. Of course, it is possible that the error was introduced in the course of OMB review, 
rather than in the PTO. It is also possible that the CBA was conducted by personnel at the PTO 
who were not lawyers or economists. These aspects of the process are opaque to the general 
public. 
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successfully tabulate social costs and benefits, so it decided to report 
on private costs and benefits instead. This conjures up the old joke 
about the economist behaving like the drunk who looks for his keys 
underneath the lamp post, not because they were dropped there but 
because it’s the only place where there’s light. But it does not explain 
how such an error made it into a final Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(RIA), or how it made it past the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which is in charge of scrutinizing cost-
benefit analyses. Another possibility is that the PTO’s focus on 
private costs and benefits is political, rather than economic. The PTO 
famously (or infamously) has described patent applicants as its 
“customers,” and it seems to understand its mission to be serving the 
interests of the parties who apply for patents.54 The false equation of 
private and social benefits might be a political statement regarding 
which interests the PTO sees as important or an effort to mollify the 
patenting community. Regardless, the error is glaring. 
The PTO’s second significant mistake is that it entirely ignores 
the costs that accompany patents. The most salient of these is the 
deadweight loss that monopoly prices impose upon consumers. The 
entire purpose of a patent is to allow an inventor to recoup the costs 
of research and development by pricing its innovative product above 
cost. These higher prices create deadweight loss when consumers who 
would otherwise purchase the product (or service), if it were priced 
competitively, elect not to purchase it at the monopoly price. Thus, 
there is an immediate first-order cost to every patent the PTO grants. 
In theory, these costs are exceeded by the dynamic benefits of patents 
in encouraging further innovation. But a cost-benefit analysis that 
does not consider these obvious costs is not really worthy of the 
name. 
The deadweight loss from monopoly patent pricing is not the 
only cost of granting patents. Patents—in particular, large numbers of 
patents—can also inhibit follow-on innovation. Most if not all 
inventions incorporate prior innovations and thus implicate existing 
patents. This means that a new innovator often must assemble 
significant numbers of patent licenses (or pay damages to a large 
 
 54. See U.S. TRADEMARK & PATENT OFFICE, WORKING FOR OUR CUSTOMERS: A 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW 12 (1994), www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ com/annual/ 
1994/ pg1-5.pdf [http://perma.cc/5XJV-EQCD]. 
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number of patent owners) for each new product it produces.55 This is 
the problem of a patent anticommons.56 The costs of doing so—the 
licensing fees or damages themselves, as well as the transaction costs 
involved—can be prohibitive and suppress innovation. Relatedly, new 
innovators often do not wish to fall victim to holdup by patent owners 
who appear and demand payment after the innovator has already 
invested in a new product.57 The solution is to determine ahead of 
time which patents might tread on the innovator’s new product and 
negotiate licenses before undertaking any product-specific 
investment. Yet as the number of existing patents increases, this 
process becomes more difficult. New innovators and market entrants 
must comb through the “patent thicket,” looking for relevant patents 
amidst a bramble of property rights.58 Like the anticommons problem, 
the transaction costs involved in solving the patent thicket problem 
imposes a tax on innovation and deters market entrance. Importantly, 
anticommons and patent thicket effects operate whether or not the 
patents the PTO grants are valid and of high quality. That is to say, all 
patent grants impose costs; only certain patent grants confer benefits. 
Amazingly enough, the PTO recognized that “uncertainty 
regarding the claimed invention and scope of patent rights for 
patentees, competitors, and new entrants” can inhibit innovation.59 
Yet the PTO treated this uncertainty as a cost created by pending 
patent applications, as if the cost disappears entirely when the patent 
is granted.60 In reality, the opposite is true: a patent has no legal force 
unless and until it has been granted. And even granted patents can 
have highly uncertain scope and boundaries.61 The PTO’s analysis was 
entirely backward. 
 
 55. The issue is exacerbated by the fact that patent damages and licensing fees are often 
uncertain and difficult to calculate. See generally Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of 
Patent Licenses, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 115 (2015). 
 56. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998). 
 57. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991, 1993 (2007); Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 187, 191–92 (2011). 
 58. See Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 
871–72 (2007). 
 59. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 13. 
 60. See id. I thank Rochelle Dreyfuss for noting this point. 
 61. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2009). 
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Accordingly, I have suggested in prior work that the high cost of 
obtaining a patent, including the fees charged by the PTO, might be 
performing the beneficial function of reducing the number of patent 
applications and grants.62 Absent these up-front costs, there might be 
many more patents and much higher anticommons and patent thicket 
costs to innovators.63 That analysis led to a prescription of higher up-
front patent fees, on the theory that these fees would mitigate 
anticommons and patent thickets problems by weeding out largely 
worthless patents without preventing inventors from obtaining 
patents on genuinely valuable innovation.64 In failing to account for 
the costs created by patent anticommons and thickets, the PTO errs 
by treating lower fees—and greater numbers of patents—as an 
unalloyed good. 
The PTO’s error is particularly galling because in other parts of 
its analysis the agency appeared to recognize the value of eliminating 
patents. The PTO noted that higher back-end renewal fees will lead 
patent owners to renew fewer patents.65 The agency then explained 
that “this decrease in maintenance fee renewals could facilitate 
commercialization because subject matter previously covered by a 
patent would become available in the public domain to improve upon 
and spur innovation.”66 This is true, but it is equally (or more) true for 
patents that were never applied for or granted in the first place.67 
In counting only the benefits and not the costs of granting more 
patents, it is as if the PTO is operating under two grand assumptions: 
(1) Congress, the courts, and the agency itself have correctly 
calibrated the substantive rules governing patents; and (2) the PTO is 
properly following those rules. In theory, Congress and the courts 
have tried to balance the static costs and dynamic benefits of patents 
 
 62. David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
677, 686 (2012); Masur, supra note 44, at 711–12. 
 63. Masur, supra note 44, at 711–12.  
 64. Id. at 712–16. 
 65. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 21. 
 66. Id. at 21–22. 
 67. It is possible that the patent itself provides some useful information to the public that 
aids in further development or commercialization of the invention, and this is one potential 
reason why it might be preferable for a patent to be filed and then not renewed than never filed 
at all. However, most scholars agree that patents provide very little useful disclosure. See 
sources cited supra note 48. Any minor value from disclosure would likely be outweighed by the 
costs to innovation of having the patent in force for some number of years.  
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so as to maximize welfare.68 If they have done so properly, then 
patents should lead to welfare gains. So long as the PTO is correctly 
applying these substantive rules and granting only the patents that the 
unerring Congress and the courts believe should be granted, more 
patents will lead to greater welfare gains. In other words, if Congress 
and the courts have done their job correctly, and if the PTO 
accurately applies the rules they have set, then there is no need for 
further cost-benefit analysis. Congress and the courts have already 
done the cost-benefit balancing in setting patent rules, and the 
benefits outweigh the costs. The PTO need only apply these rules 
faithfully. 
Almost needless to say, this is as heroic as assumptions can be. 
There is absolutely no reason to believe that Congress and the courts 
have properly tuned the patent rules to maximize welfare (or 
innovation, or anything else).69 Moreover, at this point it is impossible 
to conclude that patents are even increasing innovation, rather than 
retarding it. There is an ongoing controversy on this point, with no 
decisive resolution in sight.70 The constant tweaking of patent law by 
the courts71 and Congress72 is evidence that those bodies themselves 
do not feel as though patent law is properly calibrated at any given 
instant. And few assumptions are as heroic as to believe that the PTO 
follows the rules properly and grants only the patents that it should be 
granting. There is ample reason to believe that the agency regularly 
allows invalid patents to slip through the cracks, creating costs for 
consumers and innovators that are not balanced by any benefits.73 
 
 68. Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property Law and the 
Promotion of Welfare 1 (Dec. 22, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 69. See Masur, supra note 3, at 278–79 (arguing that the courts lack the institutional 
capacity to design such rules, even if they wished to, and observing that Congress has failed to 
imbue the PTO with agency rulemaking authority). 
 70. See Nicholas, supra note 2, at 406.  
 71. From 2005 through 2015, the Supreme Court alone decided twenty-three patent cases, 
most of which involved significant changes to the law. Dennis Crouch, Most Cited Supreme 
Court Patent Decisions, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 11, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/ 2015/03/ 
supreme- court-cases.html [http://perma.cc/MUF9-J6DN]. Additionally, the Federal Circuit 
decides hundreds of patent cases each year.  
 72. The America Invents Act is just one example of these efforts. See Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 73. See generally Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: 
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 
(1999).  
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All of this is to say that the PTO cannot rely upon the intrinsic 
accuracy of the patent laws to justify its unmitigated emphasis on 
more and more patents. Patents create both benefits and costs, and in 
some cases the costs undoubtedly outweigh the benefits. Those costs 
likely become greater as the number of granted patents increase and 
exacerbate anticommons and patent thickets problems. By ignoring 
the costs of patents, the PTO described only half of the picture. 
C. Qualified vs. Quantified Benefits 
One of the most remarkable facts about the PTO’s cost-benefit 
analysis is that both benefits and costs are presented only in 
qualitative, not quantitative, terms. The PTO does not attach 
numbers to any of the costs or benefits it describes. Instead, it 
designates those benefits or costs as “[s]ignificant,” “[m]oderate,” or 
“[m]inimal,” and then uses these qualitative designations to compare 
benefits and costs across the various regulatory options it considers.74 
The PTO offered two separate explanations for this decision, 
neither of which is persuasive. At one point, the agency asserted that 
the rule “is considered to be a transfer payment from one group to 
another”75 and thus under Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
Circular A-4, the agency is permitted to limit its discussion of costs 
and benefits to qualitative terms. OMB Circular A-4 is one of the 
principal guidance documents for agencies performing cost-benefit 
analysis. As the PTO claims, Circular A-4 states that agencies need 
not quantify costs and benefits for transfer payments: “You should 
not include transfers in the estimates of the benefits and costs of a 
regulation. Instead, address them in a separate discussion of the 
regulation’s distributional effects.”76 As I noted above, the fees 
collected from patent applicants by the PTO are indeed transfer 
payments. Per Circular A-4, they need not be included in a cost-
benefit analysis.77 But the other costs and benefits of the rule—the 
labor resources required to examine patents, and the benefits (or 
 
 74. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 4 tbl.1-1. 
 75. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212, 4213 (Jan. 18, 2013); see also U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 31 (describing various fee calculations). 
 76. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, at 
38 (2003). 
 77. Id. It is worth noting that the PTO did not address the distributional effects of these 
transfer payments, as required by Circular A-4. Id. The distributional effects may not be 
insignificant, as in many cases the PTO is collecting four- or even five-figure fees from “small” 
and “micro” entities that often have few resources. 
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costs) of more and faster patents—are not transfer payments, as the 
PTO’s own RIA makes clear.78 Accordingly, they should have been 
quantified. 
The PTO’s RIA offers a different explanation. That document 
explains that “[t]he overall impact of the costs and benefits arising 
from fee adjustment are difficult to monetize or quantify. Therefore, 
this RIA analyzes the change in qualitative costs or benefits . . . .”79 
When the agency states that the costs and benefits are difficult to 
monetize or quantify, it is underselling the point. Patent costs and 
benefits are extraordinarily difficult to quantify because they involve 
multiple dynamic economic effects and the interaction of a variety of 
different market participants. Part IV will explore this point in 
greater detail. 
Yet the difficulty of quantifying costs and benefits does not 
diminish the importance of doing so. In other work, Eric Posner and I 
have described the frequency with which agencies fail to fully 
quantify costs and benefits.80 In at least one case, this failure to 
quantify contributed to the Supreme Court striking down the 
regulation.81 In many other cases, the failure to fully quantify costs 
and benefits likely led the agency to underregulate or overregulate, 
possibly by a significant margin. The problem is both epistemic and 
conceptual. If the agency does not quantify costs and benefits, how 
can it know that the rule it adopted is superior to alternatives?82 If 
cost-benefit analysis is meant to guide policymaking, and the agency 
does not know the costs and benefits of its regulation, then on what 
basis is it purporting to select a policy? 
These concerns are fully present in the PTO’s fee-setting 
regulation. In promulgating the regulation, the PTO considered four 
alternative fee structures. Alternative 1 is the option the agency 
selected: it raised up-front application fees, while holding them below 
cost, and set renewal fees well above cost.83 Alternative 2 would have 
set most application fees equal to the PTO’s costs, which is to say 
higher than the up-front fees in Alternative 1.84 It would have then 
 
 78. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 12–18. 
 79. Id. at 12. 
 80. Masur & Posner, supra note 12, at 2–4. 
 81. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015); see also Masur & Posner, supra note 12, 
at 1–2, 39–43 (describing the impact of the EPA’s failure). 
 82. See generally Masur & Posner, supra note 12, at 2.  
 83. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 57–64. 
 84. Id. at 64. 
MASUR IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  3:40 PM 
1720 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1701 
held renewal fees much lower than Alternative 1, such that it would 
have generated substantially less overall revenue for the agency.85 
This would have meant fewer patent applications, due to the higher 
application costs. It would have also meant a slower application 
process and increased application pendency because the PTO would 
not have been able to hire as many additional examiners. Given the 
PTO’s view of patent benefits—more and faster patents are always 
better—it was easy for the agency to conclude that Alternative 1 was 
superior to Alternative 2 even without quantifying benefits. 
With respect to the other alternatives, however, the picture is not 
so clear. Alternative 3 would have simply adjusted existing fees for 
inflation based on the Consumer Price Index.86 This would have held 
down application fees (compared with Alternative 1) and thus 
encouraged more patent applications. However, it would not have 
generated enough revenue for the PTO to hire more examiners, 
contributing to delays in examination and increased patent 
pendency.87 The PTO concluded that Alternative 1 was superior to 
Alternative 3,88 but it is hard to be confident in this conclusion even 
on the PTO’s own terms. After all, according to the PTO, more 
patents represent a benefit. Longer wait times before patents are 
granted represent a cost. Do the costs of longer pendency outweigh 
the benefits of more patents? Without quantifying these costs and 
benefits, it is simply impossible to know.89 
Lastly, Alternative 4 employed the same basic structure as 
Alternative 1: increased up-front application fees that were 
nonetheless priced below cost, coupled with increased renewal fees 
that would allow the PTO to hire more examiners and reduce the 
patent backlog.90 The difference between Alternative 1 and 
Alternative 4 was the size of the fee increase: Alternative 4 would 
have raised fees even more than Alternative 1.91 This would have 
reduced the number of patent applications (compared with 
 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 72. 
 87. Id. at 72–73. 
 88. Id. at 57.  
 89. This is, of course, not to speak of the fact that more patents may not be a benefit, and 
longer wait times may not be a cost. Here, I take the PTO’s vision of costs and benefits at face 
value, despite the fact that it is demonstrably incorrect. See supra notes 58–60 and 
accompanying text. 
 90. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 79. 
 91. See id. 
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Alternative 1) but also brought in more fee revenue.92 The PTO 
initially proposed implementing Alternative 4 in its Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking but backtracked and settled on Alternative 1 
after protests from technology firms that thought the fee increases 
were too substantial.93 Notably, the PTO did not plan to hire more 
examiners under Alternative 4 than under Alternative 1.94 The excess 
fee revenue would instead have gone into the PTO’s general budget, 
not used to reduce the patent backlog.95 Accordingly, it was 
straightforward for the PTO to justify its choice of Alternative 1 over 
Alternative 4. Alternative 4 would reduce patent applications by 
imposing higher up-front fees without any corresponding benefits.96 
Of course, the fact that the additional fee revenue would 
disappear without producing any benefits is an artifact of the PTO’s 
budget, not an inherent aspect of the Alternative 4 fee schedule. If 
permitted by Congress, the PTO could have devoted the additional 
revenue to hiring more examiners, enabling the agency to reduce the 
patent backlog even more rapidly and cut the average pendency 
between application and grant. Indeed, the PTO is required by law to 
collect fees only to fund its operations, not for any other purpose. 
Had the PTO spent the additional fees on hiring more examiners, it 
would have faced a difficult choice between Alternatives 1 and 4: 
more patents under Alternative 1, but faster patents under 
Alternative 4. If one again takes the PTO’s view of patent costs and 
benefits at face value, there is no obvious way to make this choice 
without quantifying costs and benefits.  
*   *   * 
In sum, the PTO’s cost-benefit analysis is plagued by both 
conceptual and epistemic errors. The agency does not understand the 
costs and benefits of patents, and thus it does not properly count the 
benefits and ignores the costs. The agency also failed to quantify any 
of the costs or benefits of its rule, leaving it completely at sea when 
 
 92. Compare id. at 62 tbl.5-3 (showing application filings ranging from 395,226 in FY 2013 
to 467,499 in FY 2017, and fee revenue ranging from $2,479 in FY 2013 to $2,909 in FY 2017 
under Alternative 1), with id. at 83 tbl.5-10 (showing application filings ranging from 391,411 in 
FY 2013 to 453,578 in FY 2017, and fee revenue ranging from $2,491 in FY 2013 to $3,088 in FY 
2017 under Alternative 4). 
 93. See id. at 79–80. 
 94. See id. at 88, 104 (showing that both alternatives allowed hiring 1000 new patent 
examiners in FY 2013). 
 95. Id. at 79–80. 
 96. Id. at 129. 
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choosing between reasonable alternatives. It is not difficult to 
sympathize with the PTO, because calculating the costs and benefits 
of patents is extraordinarily difficult. But without any real 
understanding of costs and benefits, the PTO has no reason to believe 
that its new fee schedule will do more good than harm and no 
defensible basis for selecting one set of fees over another. 
III.  ERRORS OF OMISSION: THE PTO’S PROCEDURAL RULES 
The AIA also created a trio of new administrative proceedings 
by which patents can be challenged, located within the PTO and 
presided over by administrative patent judges. Inter partes Review 
(IPR) allows any party to bring an adversarial challenge to a patent, 
even while that party is embroiled in litigation over the same patent;97 
Post-Grant Review (PGR) permits a party to challenge a patent as 
improvidently granted within nine months after the PTO has issued 
the patent;98 and Covered Business Method (CBM) patent review 
offers a specialized process for challenging business method patents.99 
In addition to creating these three new proceedings, the AIA 
delegated authority to the PTO to establish procedural rules 
governing them.100 The result was a lengthy rule promulgated by the 
PTO on August 14, 2012.101 
In addition, this rulemaking included one critical rule that the 
PTO classified as procedural but is better understood as substantive. 
Consistent with longstanding PTO practice,102 the agency decided that 
for purposes of IPR, PGR, and CBM proceedings, the agency will 
give the claims of the patent at issue their “broadest reasonable 
interpretation.”103 This is as opposed to trying to find the “best” or 
most appropriate construction of the claims, as the federal courts 
 
 97. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012). 
 98. Id. § 321. 
 99. Id. § 321 note (Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents). 
 100. Id. §§ 316–326. 
 101. 37 C.F.R. § 42 (2015). 
 102. See, e.g., In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(referring to this practice); In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (referring to 
this practice as originating from a case from the early 1980s). 
 103. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review 
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 
48,680, 48,690 (Aug. 14, 2012). The PTO uses “broadest reasonable interpretation” and 
“broadest reasonable construction” interchangeably. See 37 C.F.R. § 42(b)–(d) (2015). 
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do.104 This rule is likely to have a marked effect on patent challenges 
before the PTO. The “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard 
will, as the name indicates, lead the PTO to adopt broad 
constructions of challenged claims whenever it is reasonable to do so. 
The broader a patent’s claims, the more susceptible it is to being 
invalidated as obvious or not novel in light of prior art.105 This rule 
will thus place patent claims in greater jeopardy than if they were 
adjudicated under the standard employed by the federal courts.106 
Indeed, the Federal Circuit described the difference between the 
“broadest reasonable interpretation” standard and its own approach 
as “outcome determinative” in one appeal from an IPR.107 Scholars 
have also noted that the “broadest reasonable interpretation” 
standard provides patent defendants with an opportunity to take two 
bites at the apple: they can argue for a broad construction that invites 
invalidity during an IPR or PGR, then reverse course and pursue a 
narrower construction to defeat a claim of infringement if they are 
sued in federal court.108 
Two of these three administrative processes have proven to be 
quite popular in their first few years. As of September 30, 2015, the 
PTO had received 3,578 petitions for IPR, along with 382 petitions for 
CBM review.109 (There have been only 13 PGR petitions filed during 
the same time period.)110 In addition, patent challengers have enjoyed 
substantial success in these proceedings. Of the 575 IPRs where the 
PTO reached a final determination on the merits, 414 of them (72 
 
 104. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 105. Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 
95 (2013). 
 106. Patent owners also benefit from a presumption of validity in federal court and lose that 
presumption in IPR, PGR, and CBM proceedings. Id. at 92. But this is a matter of Federal 
Circuit law and not the subject of the PTO’s rulemaking. See id.  
 107. PPC Broadband v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, Nos. 2015-1361, 2015-1369, 
2015-1366, 2015-1368, 2016 WL 692386, at *4–5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 2016) (“Thus, while the 
Board’s construction is not the correct construction under Phillips, it is the broadest reasonable 
interpretation of ‘continuity member,’ and because this is an IPR, under our binding precedent, 
we must uphold the Board’s construction of ‘continuity member’ and ‘electrical continuity 
member.’”). 
 108. See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 904–05 (2015). 
 109. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
STATISTICS 2 (2015); Ryan Davis, USPTO Eyes Fee Hikes for AIA Petitions, Patent Filings, 
LAW360 (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/721965 [http://perma.cc/9M55-YP 
3X]. 
 110. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 109, at 2. 
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percent) ended with all of the claims at issue being cancelled,111 
compared with an invalidity rate in federal court that hovers near 50 
percent.112 Even if that rate of invalidation drops over time, the 
relevant point is that the PTO’s new administrative proceedings have 
already significantly impacted the patent landscape. The “broadest 
reasonable interpretation” standard is a substantial part of the reason. 
Nonetheless, when it promulgated the regulation the PTO was 
not required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis (and did not do so). 
OIRA did not deem the regulation to be economically significant, 
believing the regulation’s annual impact on the economy to be less 
than $100 million.113 OIRA reached this conclusion based upon 
information and analysis provided by the PTO itself.114 
The PTO’s analysis of the regulation’s economic impact is 
striking in that it displays a type of myopia very different from that 
present in its fee-setting CBA. The only costs or benefits the PTO 
included as part of its economic significance analysis were the costs of 
filing or defending the IPR petitions.115 In other words, the agency only 
tabulated the administrative costs, which fell below $100 million. It 
ignored entirely the costs and benefits that would result from 
patents—in some cases very valuable patents—being invalidated (or 
upheld) in IPR and other proceedings.116 
This approach makes no sense even if one adopts the 
assumptions undergirding the PTO’s cost-benefit analysis of its fee-
setting rule—that more and faster patents are always better, or that 
Congress, the courts, and the PTO have calibrated the patent rules 
properly.117 If the PTO creates benefits whenever it grants a patent, 
then an administrative procedure designed to invalidate already-
granted patents must be creating costs. Alternatively, if Congress and 
the courts have properly tuned the patent rules, then any mechanism 
that enables those rules to operate more smoothly or 
 
 111. Id. at 9; see also Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look 
at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 94 (2014) (analyzing earlier IPR data).  
 112. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 234–40 (1998).  
 113. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 7041, 7056 
(proposed Feb. 10, 2012). Recall that to be deemed economically significant (and trigger a cost-
benefit analysis), a regulation must have an annual impact of at least $100 million. Exec. Order 
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). 
 114. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. at 7056. 
 115. Id. at 7050. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See supra Part II. 
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comprehensively must be creating benefits. Regardless, the PTO’s 
decision to count only administrative costs could be correct only if the 
agency believed that zero patents would be invalidated via the IPR, 
PGR, and CBM processes—in other words, that those procedures 
would have no substantive impact on any patent right. Perhaps the 
agency thought that its examiners were infallible, and that review of 
their work would turn up no improvident patent grants. But this 
assumption seems a bridge too far for the PTO. 
In the context of patents, the threshold for a regulation to qualify 
as economically significant is surprisingly low. A regulation must have 
an “annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.”118 In the 
course of its IPR and PGR proceedings, the PTO adjudicates dozens 
if not hundreds of patents worth tens of millions of dollars every year, 
and undoubtedly some patents worth hundreds of millions or even 
billions of dollars.119 If the PTO’s regulation causes even one of these 
patents to be invalidated when it would otherwise be upheld, it has 
had an effect well in excess of $100 million.120 And the “broadest 
reasonable interpretation” standard is not the only aspect of the 
regulation that might affect the likelihood of success on the merits in 
an administrative proceeding. As noted above, the PTO’s regulation 
also instantiates a detailed set of procedural rules, many of which 
provide litigation advantages to one party or the other. If any of these 
procedural rules tilts the scale enough to be dispositive, that too 
would represent a significant regulatory impact on the economy. 
Of course, if the PTO invalidates a patent with $200 million in 
annual sales, that does not mean that it has created a $200 million cost 
(or benefit). As I explained at length above, these annual revenues 
represent merely a private benefit to the patent owner, not the type 
of social benefit CBA is meant to take into account.121 But the trigger 
for an agency’s obligation to perform a cost-benefit analysis is not 
that a regulation create $100 million in costs or benefits, but rather 
 
 118. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).  
 119. See, e.g., Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the 
Patent, Short the Stock; Hayman Capital Seeks to Invalidate Patents While Betting on a Drop in 
Target’s Shares, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge--fund--manager-
-kyle--bass--challenges--jazz--pharmaceuticals--patent--1428417408 [http://perma.cc/R4WQ-T3 
RS] (describing a challenge to a “Jazz Pharmaceuticals PLC patent for Xyrem, a narcolepsy 
drug with sales of $779 million” in 2014). 
 120. OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) 1 (2011) (“The $100 million threshold applies to the impact of the 
proposed or final regulation in any one year, and it includes benefits, costs, or transfers.”). 
 121. See supra Part II. 
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that it have an impact on the economy of at least $100 million. These 
are not the same thing. If a drug’s sales increase with the demise of 
the patent on the drug, the economy has been affected in the amount 
of the increase in sales. For example, the PTO’s fee-setting regulation 
was deemed economically significant because of the hundreds of 
millions of dollars in fees paid to the PTO under the regulation. This 
was despite the fact that the PTO properly classified these fees as a 
transfer payment, rather than a cost or benefit. The economic impact 
analysis is separate from the cost-benefit analysis, and here it is 
almost impossible to believe that the PTO’s regulation would not 
have had an annual impact of at least $100 million. What is more, the 
AIA explicitly directs the PTO to “consider the effect of any such 
regulation [governing IPR procedures] on the economy, the integrity 
of the patent system, the efficient administration of the Office, and 
the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings instituted 
under this chapter.”122 Even the statute itself seems to be directing the 
agency to evaluate costs and benefits. The PTO had substantial 
flexibility in designing the procedures governing IPR, PGR, and 
CBM review.123 It could have structured these procedures so as to 
promote a variety of patent policy goals. A cost-benefit analysis 
would have been the appropriate vehicle for determining the effects 
of such legal choices, and the PTO should have conducted one. 
Again, it is easy to sympathize with the PTO. Conducting a full 
cost-benefit analysis of changes to the patent rules is hardly a trivial 
exercise, as the agency itself has acknowledged.124 Yet the agency’s 
assessment of its rule, and thus of its obligation to engage in CBA, 
falls well short of what one might expect from such an expert federal 
agency. Moreover, it only reinforces the troubling questions raised by 
the fee-setting regulation regarding how the PTO understands the 
costs and benefits of patents and their impact on the economy. Could 
this really be how the PTO conceives of patents’ role in spurring 
innovation and producing social welfare gains? Such views would cast 
serious doubt upon the substantial authority the agency has already 
been afforded, not to mention proposals for vesting even greater 
lawmaking power within the PTO.125 
 
 122. 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (2012). I thank Judge Kimberly A. Moore for drawing this provision 
to my attention. 
 123. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316–326. 
 124. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 12. 
 125. See supra note 11 (noting proposals for granting the PTO additional rulemaking 
authority). 
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IV.  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PATENT RULES 
What, then, should the PTO be doing? Performing an accurate 
cost-benefit analysis of changes to patent law is a fraught exercise, but 
that does not mean that it presents an entirely unsolvable problem. In 
this Part, I sketch the contours of a cost-benefit analysis of patent 
rules. I use the PTO’s fee-setting regulation as an example, but this 
type of cost-benefit analysis could (and should) be employed for any 
major change in patent law, including changes enacted by Congress. 
A. Costs and Benefits, in Theory 
The starting point of a proper cost-benefit analysis is to 
understand the costs and benefits of patents. As described above, the 
primary benefits of patents are the increased dynamic incentives to 
invent, which in turn should (in theory) lead to more and better 
innovations. In theory, these inventions would then produce social 
welfare gains. 
These benefits must be balanced against three principal types of 
costs.126 First, patents can simultaneously discourage innovation by 
forcing follow-on innovators to navigate an undergrowth of pre-
existing property rights. Patent thickets and anticommons can retard 
innovation, and more generally, patents can serve as taxes on 
innovation when they are used to extract rents from innovative firms 
or individuals. In some industries, such as pharmaceuticals, the 
dynamic benefits of patents likely outweigh the costs. In others, such 
as software, the reverse is plausibly true.127 
Second, there is the deadweight loss created when patented 
products and services are priced above marginal cost. Here, the social 
cost is not the higher prices that consumers must pay. If a 
pharmaceutical drug costs $100 (patented price) instead of $20 
(marginal cost), the extra $80 that a consumer must pay the producer 
is not a social cost. It is merely a transfer payment.128 The social cost is 
 
 126. As with patent benefits, there are other theories as to how patents can create social 
costs. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 305, 308 (suggesting that patents can lead to socially wasteful races that can consume much 
of the value of the innovation). I do not mean to minimize alternative theories, only to focus on 
what I believe to be the most widely agreed-upon sources of social costs from patents. See 
Masur, supra note 46, at 480. 
 127. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 156–57 (2009). 
 128. The transfer payment could have distributional effects and might lower overall welfare 
if the consumer is less well off than the owners and employees of the producing firm. This 
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the welfare loss to consumers who would have purchased the drug for 
$20 but cannot or will not purchase it for $100. For instance, if there is 
a consumer who values the drug at $50, then that consumer will 
realize a gain of $30 if she is able to purchase the drug for $20. 
Raising the price from $20 to $100 deprives the consumer of this 
opportunity and causes a welfare loss of $30 measured against the 
baseline of competitive (nonpatented) pricing. 
Third and finally, there are the costs of administering the patent 
system. These can be significant, as the fee-setting and procedural 
rules demonstrate. Nonetheless, the sums of money spent to examine 
patents and administer PTO proceedings are dwarfed by the sums 
used to purchase or license patents or paid by consumers to the 
producers of patented products. In most cases, administrative costs 
will represent only a fraction of the overall costs and benefits—which 
only accentuates the PTO’s error in viewing them as the only 
economic impact from its procedural rule. 
B. Calculating Costs and Benefits 
Conceptualizing the costs and benefits of patents is the easy step. 
The harder part is measuring and predicting the effect of a rule 
change on those costs and benefits. This involves a great deal of 
empirical uncertainty that the PTO cannot currently surmount. But 
the agency is much closer to being able to perform a credible cost-
benefit analysis than it seems to realize. 
As an organizing example, consider the PTO’s fee-setting 
regulation discussed in Part II. Suppose the agency is performing a 
cost-benefit analysis of switching its fee schedule to Alternative 1 (the 
option the agency eventually adopted). The first step is to determine 
the effect of these rules on patent applications, patent grants, and 
 
distributional effect is relevant to any true welfare analysis, and in other work I have advocated 
that agencies account for it when analyzing regulations and projects. See generally Bronsteen et 
al., supra note 15. Nonetheless, distributional effects are not typically accounted for in cost-
benefit analysis, perhaps on the theory that the best way to maximize welfare is to promulgate 
efficient regulations and then tax and transfer to improve distributional outcomes. Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994); David A. Weisbach, Distributionally-
Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets Organizational Design 3 (July 7, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2450142 
[https://perma.cc/47US-EZPJ]. But see Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The 
Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2016). Regardless, 
because distributional effects are not part of conventional cost-benefit analysis, I exclude 
consideration of them here in order to simplify the challenge for the PTO. 
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patent renewals. The PTO has already gathered much of this 
information: the regulation includes estimates of the numbers of 
patent applications under the status quo and the proposed 
alternative.129 The PTO projects seventy thousand fewer patent 
applications over the first five years under the new (higher) schedule 
of fees.130 However, it expects to grant sixty thousand more patents 
during that time due to increases in the speed of patent 
examination.131 At the same time, the PTO predicts that higher 
renewal fees will lead to a 3.5 percent reduction in the number of 
patents renewed after 3.5 years, a 3 percent reduction in the number 
of patents renewed after 7.5 years, and a 6.2 percent reduction in the 
number of patents renewed after 11.5 years.132 There were 
approximately 2.5 million patents in force as of October 2014, of 
which approximately two million were younger than 11.5 years.133 A 
rough back-of-the-envelope calculation yields an estimate of 
approximately 85,000 patents that will not be renewed under the new 
fee schedule.134 In the net, this will mean twenty-five thousand fewer 
patents in force. 
Next, the agency must determine the effect—positive or 
negative—that the changes in patent applications, grants, and 
renewals will have on incentives to innovate. This is a tricky question 
to answer,135 and the overall effects of patents in encouraging or 
discouraging innovation are the subject of much debate within the 
field.136 Nonetheless, there is a significant quantity of empirical 
research on the subject.137 Even without conducting its own studies, 
 
 129. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 42 tbl.4-2. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. 
 133. Dennis Crouch, The Number of U.S. Patents in Force, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 23, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/10/number-patents-force.html [http:// perma.cc/37B3-F7EY]. 
 134. To arrive at this estimate I averaged the reduced rates at the three renewal points and 
multiplied by two million patents. 2,000,000 × (3% + 3.5% + 6.2%)/3 = 84,667 patents. Of 
course, the exact figure will depend on the precise ages of all of the patents—information that 
the PTO has readily at hand. This calculation is just meant to provide a very rough estimate and 
demonstrate that such an analysis is not beyond the PTO’s capacity. 
 135. See generally Ouellette, supra note 1. 
 136. See generally Nicholas, supra note 2 (describing studies on both sides).  
 137. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL JAMES MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009); Eric Budish, 
Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Firms Underinvest in Long-term Research? Evidence 
from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044 (2015); Ryan Lampe & Petra Moser, Do 
Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the Nineteenth-Century Sewing Machine 
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the PTO could leverage that research to arrive at a plausible 
conclusion regarding the effects of its proposed fee increases. For 
instance, in the field of biopharmaceuticals, Eric Budish, Benjamin 
Roin, and Heidi Williams have demonstrated that longer effective 
patent terms will induce greater R&D investments;138 Bhaven Sampat 
and Heidi Williams have shown that genomics patents do not seem to 
inhibit follow-on innovation;139 and Darius Lakdawalla and Tomas 
Philipson have established that the quantity of a prescription drug 
consumed by patients does not significantly increase after the patent 
covering the drug expires, which implies that the patent was not 
creating much deadweight loss.140 In combination, these findings 
suggest that more and faster pharmaceutical patents will lead to 
greater innovation without substantially restricting follow-on 
innovation or creating deadweight loss. The result will likely be an 
increase in social welfare. 
At the same time, results in other technological fields might be 
quite different. There are by now strong reasons to believe that 
patents may do little to encourage innovation or may even hamper it 
in some technological fields such as software.141 A critical question, 
then, is which technology areas will see the greatest decreases in 
patent filings or renewals from increased fees. The PTO may have 
 
Industry, 70 J. ECON. HIST. 898 (2010); Shih-tse Lo, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights: 
Experience from the 1986 Taiwanese Patent Reforms, 29 INT’L J. INDUST. ORG. 524 (2011); Petra 
Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s 
Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214 (2005); George Selgin & John L. Turner, Strong Steam, Weak 
Patents, or the Myth of Watt’s Innovation-Blocking Monopoly, Exploded, 54 J.L. & ECON 841 
(2011); Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the 
Human Genome, 121 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2013); Ryan Lampe & Petra Moser, Patent Pools, 
Competition, and Innovation – Evidence from 20 U.S. Industries Under the New Deal 29 (Stan. 
L. & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 417, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm? 
abstract_ id=1967246 [https://perma.cc/JDY3-YHSE]; Bhaven N. Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, 
How do Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21666, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers. 
cfm? abstract_id=2679705 [https://perma.cc/LL7K-K8FP]; Joan Farre-Mensa, Deepak Hegde & 
Alexander Ljungqvist, The Bright Side of Patents (2016) (unpublished manuscript), http:// 
papers. ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704028 [https://perma.cc/UBX5-YEMN]. But see 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Difficulty of Measuring the Impact of Patent Law on Innovation, 
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Sept. 24, 2015), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2015/09/the-
difficulty-of-measuring-impact-of.html [perma.cc/H6F3-4USQ] (casting doubt on Professor 
Shih-tse Lo’s analysis). 
 138. See generally Budish et al., supra note 137. 
 139. See generally Sampat & Williams, supra note 137. 
 140. Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Does Intellectual Property Restrict Output? An 
Analysis of Pharmaceutical Markets, 55 J.L. & ECON. 151 (2012). 
 141. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 127, at 156–58. 
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estimates of this, though it does not disclose that information in the 
rule or the regulatory impact analysis.142 
In addition, there may be useful analytic shortcuts available to 
the agency. The patent applications that will not be filed or renewed 
under the higher fees but would have been filed or renewed under the 
lower status quo ante fees are most likely the lowest-value patents, 
those whose projected value barely exceeded the old fees and fall just 
short of the new fees. This is of particular importance with respect to 
patents that are not renewed. If a patent owner would choose to 
renew a patent after 3.5 years under the old fee schedule (for a fee of 
$1150) but would not choose to renew the same patent under the new 
fee schedule (for $1600), that patent cannot have been especially 
valuable.143 These patents are unlikely to lead to much new innovation 
or produce significant social welfare gains.144 On the other hand, these 
lower-value patents will contribute as much to the creation of patent 
thickets as any relevant property right.145 Accordingly, the PTO might 
adjust downward any estimates of the positive—but not the 
negative—dynamic effects of these patents. 
At the same time, the PTO believes that the new rules will 
reduce the time it takes to obtain a patent from 21.0 months to 18.8 
months.146 This reduction in patent pendency accounts for the 
projected increase in patents granted despite the projected drop in 
the number of new applications. It is possible that these earlier patent 
grants will induce some firms to innovate more than they otherwise 
would have, particularly in fast-moving industries where patents are 
out of date after a short period of time.147 These quicker patent grants 
might also make it easier for an innovative firm to signal—to 
competitors, partners, venture capital firms, and so forth—that it has 
a promising business model.148 At the same time, 2.2 additional 
months represents only approximately 1 percent of a patent’s 
 
 142. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212 (Jan. 18, 2013); U.S. PATENT 
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9. 
 143. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4225 tbl.4. 
 144. Masur, supra note 44, at 689. 
 145. Id. 
 146. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 42 tbl.4-2. 
 147. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 127, at 156–65 (describing software and consumer 
electronics as industries in which patents quickly become obsolete). 
 148. See Stuart Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1063, 1067 (2008); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002); Farre-
Mensa et al., supra note 137, at 5. 
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expected lifetime.149 It is impossible to know the precise elasticity of 
innovation with respect to patent term, but it seems unlikely that a 1 
percent increase in patent lifespan would produce a substantial 
increase in inventive activity.  
Once it has calculated the dynamic benefits and costs of the 
regulation, the PTO must estimate the static deadweight losses (or 
gains). Again, the regulation is expected to result in 25,000 fewer 
patents in force. In theory, this should lead to a reduction in the 
deadweight loss created by patents, amounting to a social benefit 
from the new fee rules. However, as with the issue of patents’ 
dynamic effects, this question depends strongly upon the quality and 
value of the patents granted or not renewed. If the only patents 
affected by the changes in fees are largely valueless, then it is unlikely 
that they would affect products with significant market share.150 If a 
$1600 fee is enough to deter a patent owner from renewing her patent 
after 3.5 years, that patent owner was not earning much in the way of 
monopoly rents nor creating much in the way of deadweight loss. This 
is not to say that the effect will be zero; it may be that some firms will 
refrain from applying for patents that turn out to cover valuable 
technology, enabling consumers to purchase that technology at 
marginal cost. But the effect will likely be small. 
Finally, there are the administrative costs of examining patents 
and operating the PTO. The agency estimated that its operating 
budget for the first five years after the fee increase would total 
$13.579 billion.151 By comparison, the PTO’s operating budget in 2012, 
the last year under the old fee schedule, was $2.320 billion.152 If the 
old fee schedule had remained in effect (and remained static), the 
total operating budget over five years would have been $11.24 billion. 
The new rule thus represents $2.359 billion in additional patent 
operations costs over five years. 
 
 149. A patent is valid from the date it is granted until 20 years (240 months) after the date 
on which it is filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). Prior to the implementation of this rule, the average 
patent was pending for 21 months before being granted. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
supra note 9, at 42 tbl.4-2. Accordingly, the typical patent was in force for 240 – 21 = 219 
months. An additional 2.2 months represents an increase of approximately 1 percent of lifetime 
validity.  
 150. It is of course possible that a court will incorrectly construe a worthless patent to cover 
a valuable invention that does not rely upon the patent. The PTO should take such effects into 
account. 
 151. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212, 4215 (Jan. 18, 2013). 
 152. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2 (2012). 
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This brief outline of a PTO CBA immediately highlights the 
importance of attempting to quantify the costs and benefits at hand. 
How should the PTO balance the potential benefits of thinning the 
patent thicket, and the potential gains (or losses) to innovation from 
the dynamic effects of more and faster patents, against the increased 
costs of patent operations? Moreover, even if the PTO concludes that 
its alternative fee structure is superior to the status quo, how can it 
know whether it is superior to other options? For instance, this sketch 
indicates that the reduction in valid patents brought about by higher 
renewal fees could represent a critical source of benefits. Perhaps the 
PTO should have raised renewal fees even more and then transferred 
the funds to the general federal fisc rather than spending them on 
patent operations.153 This would reduce the costs of patent thickets 
and anticommons without driving up the costs of patent operations. 
Curing the “patent backlog” is a politically popular cause and one of 
the few reforms that nearly all patent stakeholders support, but it may 
not be a wise use of resources.154 Granting patents more quickly surely 
increases the private value of those patents to their owners, but it is 
much less clear whether it creates social benefits great enough to 
justify the added expenditures. This is precisely the sort of question a 
CBA is designed to answer. 
These issues are not merely hypothetical. Recall that the PTO 
initially proposed to adopt a similarly structured fee schedule with 
higher overall fee rates—Alternative 4. The PTO rejected this option 
in favor of the more modest Alternative 1, apparently under political 
pressure from patent filers. The agency wrote that “many patent 
stakeholders viewed the rapid pace for building the operating reserve 
under Alternative 4 (and the required higher fees to support this 
effort) as too aggressive.”155 The interests of these stakeholders—who 
represent just the patent ownership side of the equation—may not 
have been well aligned with the interests of society at large, including 
consumers of patented products and firms that produce goods 
 
 153. See Masur, supra note 44, at 724 (offering a similar suggestion); Email from Professor 
Brian J. Love to the Hon. Michelle K. Lee, Re: Requests for Comments on Enhancing Patent 
Quality (May 6, 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 2015quality_f_ love_06 
may 2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/78KF-23Z7] (suggesting that the PTO raise application fees in 
order to weed out patents asserted by patent trolls); James E. Bessen & Brian J. Love, Make the 
Patent “Polluters” Pay: Using Pigovian Fees to Curb Patent Abuse, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 
84, 86 (2013) (same). 
 154. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1496 (2001). 
 155. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 80. 
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without seeking IP. Higher fees might have been even more 
successful in reducing the patent thicket and minimizing patent 
deadweight loss without overly diminishing incentives to innovate.156 
One of the primary purposes of cost-benefit analysis is to ensure that 
agencies regulate on the basis of sound policy and the general 
interests of society, rather than the particular goals of the interest 
groups that have the agency’s ear.157 This may be an instance in which 
a cost-benefit analysis would have revealed that the PTO should have 
acted far more aggressively, even over the objections of the agency’s 
“customers.”158 
Nonetheless, it would be error to overstate the ease of 
performing a complex cost-benefit analysis with dynamic patent 
effects at its center. As I have repeatedly noted, this is a difficult 
economic question about which there is no empirical or theoretical 
consensus. At the same time, agencies frequently complete cost-
benefit analyses where the science and economics are in some 
dispute.159 As I have argued in other work, agencies should make 
educated guesses when they are uncertain about a cost or benefit, and 
those educated guesses should be updated over time as the agency is 
able to gather further information.160 Such an approach might have led 
the PTO to craft a fee-setting rule that more effectively furthered 
innovation while protecting consumers and producers from the costs 
of excessive patenting. The PTO owes all of its stakeholders nothing 
less. 
CONCLUSION 
The Patent and Trademark Office deserves credit for 
undertaking the devilishly complex task of performing a cost-benefit 
 
 156. One commenter even suggested such an approach to the PTO during the notice-and-
comment period prior to the promulgation of the rule. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 4252 (“A commenter noted that the Office’s goal of ‘fostering innovation’ fails to 
take into account the externalities that marginal (i.e., low value) patents impose on producing 
companies, other innovators, and the public . . . .”). The PTO responded to this point with 
boilerplate language about measures it has taken to improve patent quality and a repetition of 
its argument linking lower fees to increased patenting and greater innovation. Id. 
 157. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 16, at 6. 
 158. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 159. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1561, 1577 (2011) (describing and analyzing an 
Interagency Working Group calculation of the social cost of carbon, an issue subject to great 
scientific and economic uncertainty). 
 160. Masur & Posner, supra note 12, at 4. 
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analysis on changes to patent rules. Nonetheless, the result falls well 
short of what a CBA should accomplish even under the most difficult 
of circumstances. The PTO does not seem to understand how patents 
actually produce costs and benefits, which leads it to confuse private 
benefits and costs for social ones and to ignore crucial categories of 
costs and benefits as well. The result is one cost-benefit analysis that 
sheds little light on the regulation it is meant to describe, and another 
regulation that should have been analyzed in cost-benefit terms but 
was not. Proper cost-benefit analysis might well have revealed that 
one or both of these regulations should have been substantially 
revised. For all of the economic uncertainty that surrounds patents, it 
is not beyond the PTO’s powers to conduct a proper CBA. The 
agency should endeavor to do so, lest it squander the rulemaking 
authority it has been granted and convince Congress not to make the 
same mistake again. 
